Den Hemmelige Krig - Klip for Klip

JyllandsPosten har gjort sig den ulejlighed at få en journalist med erfaring fra DR-dokumentar´s dunkle baglokaler til at gennemgå "dokumentaren" Den Hemmelige Krig klip for klip. Det er der kommet en artig artikel ud af. I får starten:

"Den hemmelige krig" er ikke en journalistisk dokumentarfilm i klassisk forstand. Den blander undersøgende journalistik med effekter, hentet fra filmens verden.

Sammenstødet mellem to genrer illustreres af, at filmkonsulent Dola Bonfils fra Det Danske Filminsitut valgte at støtte filmen med knapt 1,2 mio. kr. på grund af dens "kunstneriske værdi", mens kanalchef på DR2, Gitte Rabøl, indstillede filmen til journalisternes Cavling-pris som et fremragende eksempel på undersøgende journalistik.

"I DR begyndte blandingsformen omkring 2002, og den skabte voldsomme diskussioner," fortæller Erik Valeur. ...

"Den filmiske form er jo fin nok, hvis man havde brugt den på en spændende, men ukontroversiel historie om danske jægersoldaters indsats i Afghanistan. Problemet opstår, når der er flere synsvinkler, som der nødvendigvis er i undersøgende journalistik. I "Den hemmelige krig" bruger Christoffer Guldbrandsen de filmiske virkemidler til at banke én synsvinkel igennem, i stedet for at stille de modstridende synspunkter op mod hinanden. Og der er skruet ekstremt meget på de filmiske knapper, for at få det til at lykkes. Resultatet er blevet semijournalistik. Man har solgt meget ud af de klassiske journalistiske og dokumentariske principper, for at få plads til de filmiske effekter, hvis man skal sige det pænt," siger Erik Valeur. ...

På paletten af virkemidler er ifølge Erik Valeur bl.a.:

Flag på soldaterskulder - vises igen og igen. Vi ved ikke hvem soldaten er, hvor han befinder sig, eller hvornår. Formålet er at forbinde danske soldater til alt, hvad vi ser.

Fly der lander og letter - formålet er primært at forbinde Kandahar-lejeren, hvor de danske soldater var, til Guantanamo-basen på Cuba, der bruges som symbolet på USA's overtrædelse af Geneve-konventionerne. Det er et stort problem for Guldbrandsens historie, at ingen af de 34 afghanere, som danske soldater bevisligt tog til fange, endte på Guantanamo.

Fanger der ydmyges, får hætter over hovedet, knæler i støvet - skal linke til mishandling og tortur.

Stillbillede af Jægerkorpsets tidligere chef Frank Lissner og statsminister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, hvor de smiler lidt fjoget, bruges igen og igen. Fortæller seerne, at de to griner og skjuler sandheden.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen i Folketinget - vises talrige gange. Det er skurkens benægtelse af sandheden - krydsklippes med scener, som tilsyneladende dokumenterer noget afslørende.

Mørke billeder kontra lyse billeder. De "skyldige" vises i mørke, rystede, tågede, kornede billeder. Kritikerne, som er filmens helte, optræder i lyse, rolige billeder, naturlige kameravinkler og hyggelige omgivelser. Det taler til seerens mellemgulv: Når billederne er mørke ved du, at du er i skurkeområdet. I de lyse billeder sidder du over for en, som du hygger dig med.

Kameravinkel skråt nede fra - bruges kun én gang, i interview med forsvarsminister Søren Gade - får enhver til at ligne et skurkagtigt magtmenneske.

Lynzoom ud og ind på ansigter - bruges på nogle af filmens "skurke", Anders Fogh Rasmussen og Søren Gade.

Slow - bruges på andre af filmens skurke, forsvarschef Jesper Helsø og Forsvarskommandoens tidligere pressechef, H.C. Mathiesen.

Dramatisk/ildevarslende musik - skal understrege pointer ved at påvirke seerens mellemgulv.

Faktisk er det eneste virkemiddel, der er udeladt at interviewe folk på baggrund af persienner for at skabe associationer til fængslet/kriminalitet. Et par smagsprøver fra gennemgangen af filmen klip for klip:

0:00 - 4:00: Indledning og beslutningen i Folketinget.

EV: "Her bliver Anders Fogh puttet i shakeren. Masser af klip med ham i mørke, rystede, hoppende, kornede billeder. Kameraet farer ind og ud på hans ansigt. Sådan er det jo ikke optaget - det er lavet bagefter. Tre-fire gange ser vi ham bevæge sig væk fra kameraet med ryggen til - signalerer, at han vender ryggen til filmens sandhed."

1:00:
EV: "Vi ser den første af mange "skyldige bygninger" - en klassisk ingrediens, hvor en mørk bygning tårner sig truende op, her Statsministeriet.

Flere mørke, ekstremt urolige billeder af Anders Fogh, med dyster musik: Vi er i filmens skurkeområde." ...

2:20:
EV: Forteksterne begynder, og vi ser en blå baggrund med mystiske tegn på. Klip til Anders Fogh Rasmussens nytårstale om krigen mod terror.

3:00:
Tegningerne på den blå baggrund bliver tydelige: De skildrer torturscener. Overblænding til Anders Fogh, der holder nytårstale. Han taler om den forestående Afghanistan-mission og de værdier, der skal forsvares i krigen mod terror, mens vi vender tilbage til en tegning af en hængt mand.

EV: "De to ting har intet med hinanden at gøre, tegningerne forklares aldrig, de rummer ingen udsagt påstand - men de bruges til at dementere statsministerens idealistiske udtalelser. Det er elegant lavet, men virkelig strengt - og lidt barnagtigt." ...

7:05: Guantanamo og danskerne
Speakeren fortæller, at mens den danske tolk arbejder i lejren, bliver fanger løbende sat på transportfly og sendt ud af Afghanistan. Vi ser stillbillede af lænkede fanger med hætter over hovedet, om bord på et fly. Klip til fly. Klip til USA's præsident George Bush, som taler om "en ny type fjende, og vi tilpasser vores tankegang til den nye type fjende". Speakeren: "USA beslutter, at fangerne ikke længere skal være beskyttet at Geneve-konventionerne. De kan nu tilbageholdes på ubestemt tid, udsættes for umenneskelige afhøringsmetoder, og dømmes til døden."

EV: "Guldbrandsen har nu linket flyene til bedrag og død, og linket Kandahar til Guantanamo. Det er vigtigt, for ellers mangler halvdelen af hans historie. Jeg ville have forsøgt at dokumentere, at Danmark havde ansvar for, at fanger havnede i Guantanamo, men Guldbrandsen bruger de filmiske virkemidler i stedet." ...

10:55: Tolken
Lyden af Guldbrandsen, som over telefon interviewer vicegeneralauditør Niels Christiansen, som har undersøgt den danske tolks påstande om mishandling af fanger i Kandahar-lejren. Undersøgelsen konkluderede, at påstandene ikke kunne bevises.

EV: "Imens panorerer billedet hen over mørke bygninger og nøgne trætoppe, som spærrer for den blå himmel. Det er truende og dystert."

11:45:
Interview med John Sifton fra Human Rights Watch, som har undersøgt klager over mishandling i bl.a. Kandahar-lejren.

EV: "Her ses kontrasten mellem filmens helte og skurke. Sifton hører til de gode. Han er filmet i lyse omgivelser, hvor han taler sin sag. Kameraet zoomer ind på hans mund flere gange, mens han bl.a. siger at fangerne blev "klædt nøgne" og "hængt op i loftet" - det svarer til at man sætter noget i kursiv i en tekst, for at understrege det."

"Dokumentaren" kan stadig ses online på DR´s hjemmeside her. Se den selv, og sammenhold med Erik Valeurs gennemgang her.

Helikopter-tab i Irak

Vi hører jævnligt om helikopter-tab i Irak - senst 7. februar. Her lidt baggrund (og en sammenligning med Vietnam-krigen) fra StrategyPage:

Seven helicopters have crashed in Iraq in the last four weeks. Most appear to have been hit by hostile fire. In some of those cases, the hostile fire was carefully planned. That is, multiple machine-guns, including at least one heavy (12.7mm or larger) machine-gun were placed along a route used by helicopters, and fired in a coordinated matter. This tactic is called "flak trap," and dates back to World War II (or earlier).

The enemy has also been using portable surface-to-air missiles since 2003, including more modern models, like the SA-16 (which is similar to the American Stinger.) American helicopters are equipped with missile detection and defense (flare dispensers) equipment. Thus the most dangerous anti-aircraft weapon is the machine-gun. However, aircraft losses to ground fire have been declining every year, since 2003, mainly because of good defensive tactics. Moreover, the most vulnerable aircraft, helicopters, have been spending more time in the air. In 2005, U.S. Army aircraft (mainly helicopters) flew 240,000 hours over Iraq. That increased to 334,000 hours last year, and is expected to go to 400,000 hours in 2007. The more time helicopters are in the air, the more opportunities someone has to shoot at them.

Since 2003, the United States has lost 57 helicopters in Iraq. Most of them (29) belong to the U.S. Army, the rest are marine and civilian (mainly security contractors.) In the last year, helicopters were fired on about a hundred times a month, and about 17 percent of the time, the helicopters were hit. In Vietnam (1966-71), 2,076 helicopters were lost to enemy fire (and 2,566 to non-combat losses). In Vietnam, helicopters flew 36 million sorties (over 20 million flight hours). In Vietnam, helicopters were about twice as likely to get brought down by enemy fire. As in Iraq, the main weapons doing this were machine-guns. Today's helicopters are more sturdy, partly because of Vietnam experience, and are more likely to stay in the air when hit, and land, rather than crash.

Iran fange med fingrene langt nede i kagedåsen

For nogle dage siden begyndte USA at afsløre de beviser, de har på, at Iran via sine lokale stråmænd myrder koalitions-soldater i Irak, noget der allerede var almindelig kendt blandt de danske soldater i Irak for over et år siden (se feks. Information 28. januar sidste år). Beviserne, der hidtil er fremlagt er hovedsageligt iransk-producerede våben der er blevet fundet under razziaer på terrorist-baser eller under angreb på koalitionsstyrker. En grafik over det fremlagte kan ses hos New York Times her.

Fra New York Times´referat fra briefingen. Alle de nævnte våben er iransk-producerede:


Three senior coalition defence officials including a defence official, an explosives expert and a defence analyst presented the following evidence:

* Fragments of an Iranian-made roadside bomb known as an explosively formed penetrator (EFPs). The US military first detected use of EFPs in 2004, but noted a big increase in 2006. EFPs use shaped charges, which penetrate armour by focusing explosive power in a single direction and by firing a metal projectile embedded in the device into the target at high speed. They are strong enough to penetrate an Abrams tank.

* Fragments of fins from 81-mm and 60-mm mortar bombs. One grenade from a rocket-propelled grenade launcher.

* False IDs of Iranians who were detained at an Iranian government office in Arbil in Iraq's autonomous region of Kurdistan last month.


* Slides showing other weapons, including a shoulder-fired surface-to-air missile. There was no evidence these weapons had been used to shoot down helicopters, the officials said.

* Slides showing a complete mortar bomb, with serial and manufacturing number. ...

* The officials accused five Iranians arrested by US troops in Arbil in January of being members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Qods Force, which they said was getting its orders from the "highest levels" of the Iranian Government.


* The Qods Force was accused of training and funding Iraqi militants.

* The five detained in Arbil were not carrying diplomatic passports and included one man who was a Qods Force operational chief. During the arrest raid, they tried to flush documents down a toilet. One of those arrested had traces of explosives on his body, the offiicals said. ...

* The officials said Iran has several surrogate groups in Iraq, including rogue elements of the Mehdi Army militia of radical Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. They said these elements "carried out the majority" of the EFP attacks.


* Another group was the network of a former official of the Badr Organisation, which is part of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a major Shi'ite political organisation.

* Iraqi smugglers are bringing bomb components and money in vehicles at night across three points along the Iranian-Iraqi border, the officials said



Blandt de 170 koalitions-soldater, der er blevet dræbt af vejsidebomber som de ovenfor nævnte i Irak er tre danskere:

Bjarke Olsen Kirkmand






Jesper Nielsen



Kim Wadim




På baggrund af USA´s præsentation af efterretninger om masseødelæggelsesvåben i Irak, som siden kun blev fundet godt fem hundrede stykker af blev der øjeblikkeligt rejst tvivl om, om iranske våben brugt til at myrde koalitions-soldater automatisk betyder involvering af den iranske regering. Tvivlen herskede endda i det amerikanske militær.

Men hvad hvis man i Irak havde fundet over hundrede snigskytterifler, som man kan bevise allerede efter 45 dage i iranske hænder blev brugt til at myrde den første koalitions-soldat i Irak? (via LFG):

Austrian sniper rifles that were exported to Iran have been discovered in the hands of Iraqi terrorists, The Daily Telegraph has learned.


More than 100 of the .50 calibre weapons, capable of penetrating body armour, have been discovered by American troops during raids. The guns were part of a shipment of 800 rifles that the Austrian company, Steyr-Mannlicher, exported legally to Iran last year.


The sale was condemned in Washington and London because officials were worried that the weapons would be used by insurgents against British and American troops.


Within 45 days of the first HS50 Steyr Mannlicher rifles arriving in Iran, an American officer in an armoured vehicle was shot dead by an Iraqi insurgent using the weapon.

Et søm i DR´s kiste

Nyhedsavisen har i de sidste par uger gjort et eksemplarisk arbejde i at pille DR´s propagandafilm "Den Hemmelige Krig" grundigt fra hinanden. I dag kom endnu et søm i DR´s troværdigheds ligkiste, med yderligere baggrund til, hvorfor tilfangetagne jihadi´ers påstande på ingen måde kan tages for pålydende:

DR-dokumentarens kronvidne afviser at der fandt vold eller overgreb sted i Afghanistan i 2002.

»What the hell are you do­ing?« – »Hvad fanden har du gang i?«.

Chef Irvine – alias Chris Irvine, om dagen leder af afhøringscentret i Kandehar – havde taget telefonen, trykket nummeret til Tom Cavanaugh, en sergent, der var gået for langt. Han havde anbragt en fange på knæ og bedt ham holde armene strakt ud for sig.

Fangen var en »cocky fuck« – og det er grimt. Stop, skreg Irvine, men Cavanaugh afviste.

»Det er sgu' ikke værre end vores militære træning,« sagde han.

»Forskellen er,« gjorde Chris Irvine det klart, »at du selv meldte dig til den militære træning.«
Og sådan blev det. Overgrebet stoppede, før det var begyndt.

Typisk dag i Kandehar

Historien er, forsikrer Chris Hogan, typisk for hans oplevelser som afhøringsleder i Kandahar-lejren i Afghanistan fra slutningen af 2001 til august 2002.

Fangerne blev behandlet godt, fortæller Chris Hogan.

»Ikke én eneste gang har jeg set, hørt om, for slet ikke at sige deltaget i noget, der minder om overgreb eller tortur – noget, der på nogen måde overtræder Geneve-konventionen,« forsikrer han over for Nyhedsavisen i telefonen fra Connecticut. ..

I DR-dokumentaren påstås det, at fanger led overlast, men instruktør Christoffer Guldbrandsen har ikke i sin film medtaget ét eneste ord fra samtalerne med Chris Hogan, hvor han ellers hver gang siger det samme:

Ingen vold, ingen overgreb, ingen overtrædelser af konventionen.

Pris for at følge reglerne

'Desværre' er et forkert ord – og så alligevel. For det var dødfrustrerende for Hogan og de andre forhørsledere, at det stort set var umuligt at vride et ord ud af de utallige Taleban-krigere, der kom ind i lejren, efterhånden som kampene skred frem:

»Jeg er sikker på, at vi – netop fordi vi fulgte reglerne – ikke fik knækket personer, der kendte til konkrete terrorplaner eller terrorceller, og at det en dag vil skade vores land,« siger Chris Hogan. ..

»Vi var trænet i positiv afhøring. Vi skulle have en venlig tilgang, det var filosofien – for eksempel ved at lokke en tilfangetagen sovjetisk soldat med, at han kunne komme til USA og bo i New York, når krigen var slut,« fortæller Chris Hogan.

Teknikkerne var indrettet på, at 95 procent af fangerne ville samarbejde, mens fem procent ikke ville. I Afghanistan var det omvendt.

»Venlighed? De var ligeglade. De var ikke interesserede i vores venlighed«,,husker han.

Al-Qaeda-plan gav chok

Afhøringsfolkene fik et sandt chok, da amerikanske soldater en dag dukkede op med en 'afhøringsmanual' på cirka 60 sider, fundet i felten hos nogle al-Qaeda-folk.

Manualen beskrev en række metoder til at sabotere en afhøring og indeholdt, husker Chris Hogan, en »rystende og rammende præcis beskrivelse« af den amerikanske virkelighed.

Det blev beskrevet, at amerikanerne ikke ville skade fangerne, selvom de kunne have lyst. Ligesom manualen fortalte, hvordan man som fange skulle klage øjeblikkeligt, hvis man led overlast. Af manualen fremgik det også, at en fange kunne ødelægge en forhørsleders karriere ved at fremvise et ar eller en skade til Røde Kors, og at amerikanernes uvilje mod at bruge tortur i afhøringerne var udtryk for »amerikansk svaghed.« ..

Da Hogan ankom til landet, var han fast besluttet at følge konventionerne til sidste bogstav. Alle fulgte reglerne, undtagen Tom Cavanaugh, der råbte af fangerne og af og til, indtil nogen så og stoppede det, og anbragte fangerne i stressende situationer.

Men, medgiver Hogan, efterhånden udviklede afhøringsfolkene metoder til at omgå Geneve-konventionen.

At berøve fanger deres søvn er for eksempel forbudt, men i Afghanistan udviklede afhøringsfolkene en anden variant: Man lod afhøringerne fortsætte i op til 30 timer. Det var tilladt, når bare også de selv (og ikke kun fangen) måtte holde sig vågne, mente afhøringsfolkene.

At true fanger med at blive henrettet er også forbudt, men også den regel blev omgået: Da stort set alle de fanger, der blev bragt ind til basen, ikke var soldater, men krigere, og næsten altid bar civilt tøj, kunne man kalde dem spioner – og spioner kan henrettes. Derfor truede amerikanerne i en række tilfælde fangerne med at blive henrettet.

Stolt af det er Chris Hogan ikke, forstår man. Men sådan var virkeligheden: Den amerikanske ledelse sukkede efter viden, men fik stort set ingen, dertil var fangerne alt for ligeglade – og forhørslederne alt for venlige.

Som det fremgik af den al-Qaeda-manual, der blev fundet:

»Amerikanerne vil give dig tre halal-måltider om dagen og ret til brusebad nogle gange om ugen. Men lyv over for dem, nægt at fortælle noget, skift historie – der er intet, de kan gøre.«

Mens vi venter på 20.000 amerikanere

Allerede før yderligere 20.000 amerikanske tropper er landet i Irak begynder de at påvirke kampene i landet. De to hoved-lejre, der lejlighedsvist slår koalitions-styrker ihjel er blevet mål for yderligere angreb i opløbet til troppeforstærkningerne:

For de sunni-muslimske jihadier i det al-Qaeda-centrerede Irakiske Mujahedin Shura-Råd er det et simpelt spørgsmål om overlevelse. Fallujah viste jihadierne, at bykamp mod amerikanere ikke fører til andet end tusindvis af døde jihadier. Derfor er de af deres nye leder Abu Ayyub al-Masri blevet beordret til at flygte fra Baghdad til Diyala-provinsen, hvor de imidlertid er blevet mål for en ny irakisk-amerikansk offensiv, der allerede har slået 50 af dem ihjel.

For de shia-muslimske jihadi der er nuværende eller tidligere medlemmer af Moqtada al-Sadr´s Mehdi-hær er det mere et spørgsmål om politisk end fysisk overlevelse, al den tid at moder-organisationen ikke officielt er i kamp med hverken den irakiske regering (den samarbejder ofte med den) eller de amerikanske styrker, men ikke desto mindre kan se sine kadrer af tortur-bødler blive stadig mere udtyndet af en bølge af arrestationer. Hidtil er over 600 Sadrister blevet sat bag tremmer, deraf 16 af høj rang. En syttende er blevet dræbt. Af samme grund er mange af lederne af Baghdads dødspatruljer også flygtet til Iran (via LGF - hold den tidligere fremførte skepsis overfor sunnimuslimske MP´ers beskyldninger for øje, men overvej også om det ikke kan være sandt):

DEATH SQUAD leaders have fled Baghdad to evade capture or killing by American and Iraqi forces before the start of the troop “surge” and security crackdown in the capital.

A former senior Iraqi minister said most of the leaders loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical anti-American cleric, had gone into hiding in Iran.

Among those said to have fled is Abu Deraa, the Shi’ite militia leader whose appetite for sectarian savagery has been compared to that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who was killed last year.

The former minister, who did not want to be named for security reasons, backed Sunni MPs’ claims that Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi prime minister, had encouraged their flight. He alleged that weapons belonging to Sadr’s Mahdi Army had been hidden inside the Iraqi interior ministry to prevent confiscation.

Maliki said last week: “I know that senior criminals have left Baghdad, others have left the country. This is good — this shows that our message is being taken seriously.”

En gruppe der stadig står en del mystik om er målet for dagens overskrifter om, at irakiske og amerikanske tropper har dræbt 250 bevæbnede ekstremister i kampe i plantagerne i Najafs nordlige forstad Zarqa. Antallet kan man stille spørgsmålstegn al den tid at det kommer fra det irakiske politi, der har en tendens til at blæse tabstal op før de har haft mulighed for at overhovedet at tælle de dræbte. Najafs guvernør siger da også, at det totale antal af ekstremister er 200, hvoraf altså ikke alle er dræbt.

Også ekstremisternes identitet er der imidlertid tvivl om. Mens guvernøren kalder dem sunnimuslimske oprørere iblandet udenlandske krigere siger shia-muslimske politiske kilder, det er en blanding af sunni-muslimer og shia-muslimer loyale over for en præst ved navn Ahmed Hassani. Reuters nøjes med det neutrale "en muslimsk kult".

Googler mand navnet Ahmed Hassani dukker der kun en enkelt nyhedshistorie op, om at han i juli, da han var tilknyttet Sadr´s Mehdi-hær, blev arresteret sammen med en kendt terrorist. Noget kunne altså tyde på endnu en aflægger af kampagnen mod Sadr´s tropper. For at krydre historien nævnes det, at de 200 ekstremister skulle have som mål at slå højtstående shiitiske præster ihjel under Ashura-højtiden, der begynder i disse dage.

Inkluderer man muligheden af, at Ahmed Hassani oprindeligt kommer fra Baghdad - og at hans tilnavn altså er al-Baghdadi - finder man ham gennem de sidste 3 år som en konstant stemme mod at sunni- og shiamuslimske irakere skal slå hinanden ihjel, og istedet koncentrere sig om at slå alle andre ihjel. Som sådan har han fordømt de demokratiske valg, har været medstifter af Det Politiske Bureau for den Irakiske Modstand, og har opnået den "ære" sammen med Mutada al-Sadr at være undtaget fra al Qaedas officielle politik med at udrydde alle Iraks shia-muslimer.

UPDATE:

Støvet er ved at lægge sig lidt efter elimineringen af nogle hundrede islamister i Najaf. Men også kun lidt. Alt efter hvilket medie, man lytter til er der nu tale om en shiitisk kult eller en blanding af shia- og sunnimuslimer der kun af ydre var shiitisk og om en irakisk gruppe eller en gruppe ledet og delvist udgjort af udlændinge. Antallet af dræbte der rapporteres om varierer mellem 200 og 350, og selv sektens/kultens/gruppens leder kan man ikke blive enige om. Oprindeligt blev som ovenfor nævnt navnet Ahmed Hassani bragt på banen. Han er nu forsvundet fra medierne, og istedet køres to andre personer på banen: Ali bin Ali bin Abi Talab i New York Times og hos BBC, og Ahmed Hassan al-Yamani i Washington Post.

Med andre ord ved vi idag reelt ikke ikke meget mere end i går.

• New York Times: Shiite Cult Aimed to Kill Clerics in Iraq
• Washington Post: Iraqis Raid Insurgents Near Shiite Holy City
• Al Jazeera: US, Iraqi forces kill 350 fighters near Najaf
• BBC: "Hundreds" killed in Iraq battle

Bemærk forøvrigt, at al Jazeera traditionen tro rapporterer de højeste tabstal, og åbenbart mener at de 120 fanger der er taget rapporteres som dræbte.

Disse piger, der bare bliver ved med at forsvinde....

En historie fra Egypten - hvor kristne piger har en tendens til pludselig at forsvinde:

Increasingly over the past few years, the Coptic community has been wrecked by the thorny issue of the ‘disappearance’ of young Coptic women—in most cases underage girls. The usual scenario is that a woman leaves her home for some perfectly normal errand or work and fails to come back. Her family reports her missing and, a few days later, the police inform them that their daughter has married a Muslim and converted to Islam, and that they were not to contact her because she wished to have nothing to do with them. Those are the lucky families though. In many instances, nothing is ever heard again of the disappeared girls. And even worse, police refuse to give any statistics of the cases.

Watani was informed of the disappearance of Marwa from Kafr Tohormos, Dina Amin and Nermine Ayad from Mehalla, Pussy from Assiut and Mona from Fayoum who both disappeared days before their wedding dates, Nevine and Maria from Alexandria, Sara from Ismailiya, Marguerite and Nariman from Ezbet al-Nakhl, Teresa from Abu-Qurqas, Mariam from Nag-Hamadi and Mariam Agaybi from Giza. All of them disappeared in 2006, and all but Mona are underage. And these are just some of the cases that were brought before Watani’s attention.

Police always claim that the girls elope because of family problems or falling in love with Muslim men. Which prompts many Copts to wonder: Have Coptic men suddenly become unattractive?

The Mehalla girl Up close and personal

On 8 October, Watani printed the story of 15-year-old Loruns Wagih Emil, the daughter of a textile merchant in the mid-Delta town of Mehalla al-Kubra, who was abducted a week earlier but managed to escape and tell her story. Amid all the details of the incident, the role of the security apparatus stood out. Loruns, her parents and lawyer, claimed she had been pressured by security officials into signing a statement denying her abduction and claiming she had simply travelled to Cairo. At the time Watani asked: “Was Loruns one in a series of what Copts claim are abductions of their daughters and forced conversions to Islam?”. Watani commented: “Girls are definitely free to adhere to Christianity or to convert to Islam, and to marry whomsoever they decide upon of their own free will, once they are of age. As minors however, their parents, the entire Coptic community, and all enlightened and fair Egyptians, demand that their parents should be allowed to see them and talk to them. They have all been officially reported missing, and it is an open secret that the police know their whereabouts. In whose interest then are they kept out of contact with their parents?”

Normal teenager

Watani recently talked to Loruns. After going with her through the by-now well known details of her abduction and escape, the 15-year-old with the clear face and merry laugh said she had been leading a normal life with her father, mother, two sisters and brother. Loruns loves playing sports and is a brown belt karate player. Watani asked Loruns and her family about the Interior Ministry’s declaration that she had been facing family problems, was depressed because of Thanawiya Amma—the Egyptian secondary school certificate, a bottleneck which Egyptian students have to pass if they are to enrol in university—and had thus fled home.

Loruns said “My mother is my friend; I can tell her anything.” “We are a close-knit family,” the mother said. “I don’t know why the Interior Ministry claimed there were problems between us. Loruns had no problem with Thanawiya Amma; rather, she is a bright student and always ranks top in her class.”

As to the father, his responsibility as a successful textile merchant never prevented him from spending time with his family. He told Watani that his relationships with his neighbours and colleagues are cordial and affectionate. “I have no enemies,” he said. All the family members are regular churchgoers—which explains the swift, strong reaction of the congregation to Loruns’ disappearance—and they frequently go on family outings on the weekend. The children play sports and the parents jog together. “My girls are always properly attired, to fit our Christian character, even without taking into consideration the predominantly Islamic-dressed community we live in.” This last remark came as a comment on an allegation that Loruns may have been indecently dressed, prompting her abduction. (Henriks kommentar: i hvilken type samfund ville det være grundlag for en kidnapning?)

Closer to God

Watani asked Loruns if she was really facing problems with her studies. “How can that be? She quietly asked. I was abducted only two weeks after the school year began; how could I have already undergone depression? Exams were still months ahead and we had not even gone into the thick of study.”

Loruns told Watani that, following her release she went to see Pope Shenouda III who took her tenderly in his arms and told her “Never fear, the Lord was with you and will always be with you.” Then she went for a spiritual retreat at St Dimiana convent in the Delta “where I spent a wonderful time,” she said. “What I went through, Loruns said, has made me feel as I though I suddenly grew up. But it has also brought me closer to God.”

UPDATE

Fra Voice of the Martyrs´ (et kristent nyhedsbureau der specialiserer sig i at dække forfølgelse af troende kristne) nyhedsbrev for 2. januar:

Police Raid Shop, Arrest Christian Shop Owner - VOM Sources On December 26, 2006, police raided a shop owned by Magdy Guirgis Fam, an active member in the Egyptian Christian Youth Union (ECYU), who works under the Coptic Orthodox Church. The police destroyed his shop, beat him and arrested him. Magdy's ministry is following up with girls that Muslims kidnap or try to forcibly convert. This ministry has protected, rescued hundreds of Christian girls who have been threatened with kidnapping or forced conversion. The secret police have threatened other members of the ECYU.

Somalia balancerer på en knivsæg

I Somalia balancerer freden efter islamisternes kollaps på en knivsæg:

The prime minister of the transitional government, Mohamed Gedi, now wants to capture or kill the fleeing hardliners “at any cost”. Although the Islamist collapse was quicker than expected, the danger is that this convincing conventional victory for the Ethiopians may be followed by an Islamist insurgency, drawing in support from militant Muslims around the world. Indeed, it would be hard to find a better recruiting poster for would-be jihadists than the Russian-built tanks of “Christian” Ethiopia bogged down in a Muslim tropical paradise. In a Taliban-like phone call from the bush, an Islamist commander promised that the movement would “rise from the ashes”.

It may well. Already there have been several unexplained bomb blasts in Mogadishu, one of them directed at a hotel where Ethiopian army officers are billeted. Two Ethiopian soldiers were shot dead on January 2nd, probably by Islamists. There is a real possibility that what army types call “asymmetrical warfare” will include suicide-bombings, in Kenya as well as in Somalia and Ethiopia. One aim would be to stir up hatred between Christians and Muslims in the region. Among the key commanders now on the run is Aden Hashi Farah Ayro. His network has grown in the last months to perhaps 200 fighters. Mr Ayro is young, around 30, and is thought to have trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. He is wanted for his suspected involvement in the killings of several foreigners in Somalia and Somaliland. He is one of those in charge of the sleeper-cells that are likely to have stayed in Mogadishu and elsewhere, waiting to strike.

Allerede for tre dage siden kunne pressen fortælle, at 3.500 islamistiske militsmænd gemte sig i Mogadishu. Officielt var det "civile", der demonstrerede mod at skulle aflevere deres våben i Mogadishu i går, men man kan tvivle.

UPDATE:

Mens jeg skrev indlægget dukkede en ny nyhed op: Kampene blussede søndag atter op i Mogadishu:

Der udbrød søndag voldsomme kampe i Somalias hovedstad, Mogadishu, efter at militsfolk angreb en lejr, der huser soldater fra nabolandet Etiopien. De nye kampe kommer blot timer efter at den somaliske regering meddelte, at den havde fået fuld kontrol over områder i det sydlige Somalia, hvor islamister havde forskanset sig efter at være blevet drevet ud af hovedstaden.

- Omkring klokken otte i aftes hørte vi en voldsom eksplosion efter at uidentificerede militsfolk angreb en lejr, hvor de somaliske og etiopiske styrker er stationeret. Og minutter senere intensivt skyderi, der varede i omkring ti minutter, siger Abdul Aziz Mohamed Gure, en indbygger i Mogadishu.

Angrebene kom timer efter at den somaliske regeringshær fastslog, at den endegyldigt havde nedkæmpet islamisterne.

- De har fuldført kampen mod islamisterne, og der er ingen magt tilbage hos de islamistiske terrorister, konstaterede kommandant Abdulrasaq Afgebub.

UPDATE II

DR´s text-tv siger stadig, der udbrød "voldsomme kampe" i Mogadishu, men der må have været grænser for, hvor voldsomme de var:

Small skirmish has broken out in the Somalia capital Mogadishu tonight between Somali militiamen and the Ethiopian forces killing at least one person and wounding two others.

The clashes came after armed militiamen attacked on military vehicles belonged to Ethiopian troops passing in front of the Sahafi hotel in southern of Mogadishu.

Both the dead and the injured were Somalis. The dead person was 13-year-old girl while one of the wounded was an old man who was in serious condition.

Witnesses told Somalinet that they heard huge explosion around 8:00 pm local time when the gunmen fired Rocket Propelled Grenade at the convoys of the Ethiopians but missed its target.

Jihad: en status

Fra The Fourth Rail, Bill Roggio med en status over en krig, der har mange navne: GWOT (Great War on Terrorism), Krigen mod Terrorisme, 4. Verdenskrig. Uanset navn har den i det seneste år set islamistiske nederlag i Somalia, Bangladesh og Filippinerne, og sejr i Pakistan. Bill Roggio dækker alle fire og en række andre fronter.

Liberating Anah

Pressen bringer masser af pessimistiske historier fra Irak - og at der er grund til det skal der da ikke lægges skjul på. Shiiterne har været undertrykt af de sunnitiske arabere i hundredevis af år, og fandt sig roligt i 3 års kontinuerlige fra al Qaeda og Saddams gamle bødler, så nu er der mange gamle regnskaber, der skal gøres op.

Alligevel er der også gode nyheder, der bare ikke når gennem medierne. Her er en af dem, fra Army Times. Når du har læst den, så spekuler på om det ikke netop er etableringen af fremskudte baser som den danske i Musa Qala i Afghanistan, der gør at kampene der er blusset op:

ANAH, Iraq — insurgents had freely waged a two-year reign of terror on this sleepy, affluent Sunni city of 30,000. They blew up the police station and chased out the nascent police force. They murdered the chairman of the city council and cowed the local populace.

Members of Jama’at Al Tawid Al Jihad, known as the JTJ or Group of Monotheism and Jihad — a branch of al-Qaida in Iraq — settled in. This city in central Anbar province came to serve as a convenient sanctuary and way station for fighters going southeast to the real action in Ramadi, Fallujah and Baghdad.

But about 20 kilometers outside Anah, a Stryker squadron commander determined it was time to end the insurgents’ grip on Anah.

Lt. Col. Mark Freitag, commander of the 4th Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, installed a Stryker infantry company in a combat outpost just outside Anah in late March. The grunts of Apache Company, 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, attached to Task Force 4-14, took aggressive action against the insurgents, whose leaders made a move to regain the initiative: They dispatched a shadowy commander named Abu Hamza to take charge of the insurgency in Anah. …

It soon became clear that if Albertus was to have any chance of reversing trends in Anah, he needed to position forces closer to the action. Freitag ordered the establishment of Combat Outpost Anah beside a major intersection just north of the city. ….

COP Anah had an immediate impact. Roadside bomb attacks in the area went from six in March, which claimed one U.S. life, to none in April. ….

Apache further reduced the insurgents’ freedom of movement April 22 by installing a small force of eight Americans and 20 Iraqis in an old veterinary clinic that became Battle Position Reyanah, which threatened JTJ elements operating out of the village. Meanwhile, Albertus began to receive a new stream of technical intelligence from COP Rawah that enabled closer tracking of insurgent suspects.

Insurgents were plotting frantically. They realized their comfort zone in Anah was vanishing — and they were determined to fight. ….

Six days later, a Saudi would-be JTJ suicide car bomber drove an orange-and-white taxi, a Chevrolet Caprice, out of a compound in Anah’s industrial area. Packed with four propane tanks rigged to explode, the Caprice was probably headed for Battle Position Reyanah. ....

After a brief standoff in the open countryside, Albertus raised his M4 and cracked off three warning shots. The taxi lurched forward and U.S. forces riddled it with a hail of .50-caliber bullets that detonated two propane tanks in an orange fireball.

The destruction of the car bomb with no friendly or civilian casualties marked a turning point in more ways than one. “This was a complete change to the [JTJ] tactics in Anah,” Albertus said. “This was a safe haven for them.”

The fact that al-Qaida in Iraq tried to employ such a high-yield weapon showed “how important and how critical controlling Anah was” to them, said Capt. Tom Hart, 4-14’s fire support officer. But the car bomber’s spectacular failure demonstrated that the JTJ no longer enjoyed freedom of maneuver in Anah. That was a turning point for both sides.

The incident gave locals more confidence to pass information to U.S. troops.This reporting was the first time Apache learned the JTJ had stood up a new cell in Anah. The organization was named for its leader, about whom Apache knew nothing but his name: Abu Hamza. ….

TF 4-14 estimated that 98 percent of the population gave either active or passive support to the insurgents, with much of the passive support resulting from intimidation rather than any feelings of true allegiance with the insurgency.

“It’s not that easy to answer the question about how many are in their heart of hearts sympathetic to us versus the [insurgents],” said Capt. Rob Dapice, Albertus’ fire support officer. “What’s more relevant is who they believe is more capable. That’s what determines how they act.” ….

Previously, JTJ had neither need nor inclination to bring violence to Anah. But Apache’s presence and intelligence-driven ability to get inside JTJ’s decision cycle forced the insurgents to confront coalition forces in the previously uncontested town.

But bringing violence into Anah made the insurgents less popular with the local Iraqis. Meanwhile, Apache’s almost constant presence gave Albertus and his men the opportunity to engage the locals. “You cannot replace getting down and talking to the people,” he said. ….

By early June, the team had entered into a very fruitful relationship with a teenage male Anah resident whose ambition was to join the police.

“He was just sick and tired of what’s going on in the town and he was willing to help us,” Albertus said.

The young man provided information about an Abu Hamza bomb-making cell. A June 2 raid led to the detention of cell leader Ahmed Abdul Jalil, as well as Saddam Shoban, a financier. Human intelligence confirmed this cell was responsible for multiple roadside bomb attacks.

“Tactical questioning” of Ahmed and Shoban at Ahmed’s house led Apache to the homes of other cell members. By the end of the night, they had detained a dozen of Abu Hamza’s men.

“This is where the targeting process at company level really starts to come together,” Albertus said. “We’ve got a source that’s very reliable; a humint team that’s executing on a daily basis, gathering information; we’ve got platoons out there gathering information on a daily basis we’ve got an S-2 shop that we’re now completely tied in with. Now we’ve got actionable targets that we’re able to conduct [close target reconnaissance] on, conduct these precision raids.” ….

Meanwhile, Apache was working on a sophisticated plan to eliminate the rest of Abu Hamza’s roadside bomb cell. The first stage was to uproot the trees that provided cover to insurgents trying to plant bombs along the main thoroughfare in the city. That pushed Abu Hamza to an intersection at the edge of town, which was right where Apache wanted him.

On the night of June 1, Apache teams began monitoring the intersection.

About 6 a.m. on June 3, Staff Sgt. Joshua Lothspiech, leader of 3rd Squad, 1st Platoon,saw a black sedan stop at the intersection. Five men emerged and immediately started to place a roadside bomb.

“They were very, very well rehearsed,” Albertus said. “Everyone knew their job.”
On Lothspiech’s command, Spc. Christopher Schof opened fire with his M240B machine gun. The insurgents tried to get back in the car.

“That’s just a coffin for them,” Albertus said.

Three were killed immediately, but two escaped, one limping from a gunshot wound. An examination of the car revealed that it was wired for use as a suicide car bomb. ….

But Abu Hamza had one big attack left. On June 28, a dump truck packed with explosives, ball bearings and keys drove out of Reyanah and headed toward Apache’s battle position just north of the village.

Apache received an intel report that an attack was imminent. Soldiers at BP Reyanah were ordered into “full battle rattle.” Four climbed onto the roof, immediately drawing small-arms fire from buildings on the northern edge of the village.

The dump truck turned left from the road into the serpentine driveway leading to the battle position. The four Apache soldiers on the roof met it with a hail of bullets, but it kept chugging forward in low gear, plowing through triple-strand concertina wire and Hesco barriers as the troops swapped out magazine after magazine.

The driver slumped over in his blood-spattered cab, but still the truck continued to lurch forward. However, instead of driving through the compound’s metal gate, as the driver intended, the vehicle pushed halfway through the cinder block wall, coming to rest against a Leyland truck before exploding in an enormous fireball that engulfed the battle position and threw the Leyland truck into the building.

Two Iraqi soldiers were had been killed and seven were wounded.

Apache had just enough time to vector an AV-8B Harrier over the battle position for the aircraft to film the explosion. (video her) ….

Apache hit back July 1, raiding a car wash they had identified as an Abu Hamza car bomb factory and meeting place. They detained Abu Qusay, an insurgent facilitator. Intelligence tips told Apache of Abu Hamza’s increasing frustration “at how deep we were able to get into [his] decision cycle,” Albertus said.

Pressure intensifies

In late June, the first batch of Iraqi police returned from Jordan, and things got worse for Abu Hamza. Immediately, two policemen from Anah approached the humint team leader and offered up a treasure trove of intelligence on the insurgent structure in Anah. ….

For the first time, Apache was able to draw up a “wiring diagram” of the insurgent structure in Anah. After talking with the humint team leader, Albertus said he “decided to go after the big guys first.” ….

The stage was set for Apache to drive a stake through the heart of Abu Hamza’s group. In the early hours of July 8, the company conducted four nearly simultaneous cordon and searches, each aimed at securing a different Abu Hamza figure. ….

Each Apache element secured its objective less than two minutes after arrival, taking care to enter each compound silently, so as not to alert neighbors. By daybreak, Apache troops had detained 14 suspects, including four of Abu Hamza’s top aides, without firing a round. The detainees included four of Abu Hamza’s top aides: Marwan Hashim Abdulhadi, deputy commander; Firas Abdullah Mohammed, Abu Hamza’s new number three; Jamil Muhaysan, aka Abu Muthir, the third-ranking JTJ leader in Anbar; and Rafa’a Muhammed Noori, another senior JTJ leader in Anbar.

Marwan Hashim Abdulhadi, had been watching TV and drinking tea with his sister and his brother’s wife when Apache’s 1st Platoon entered the house.

A search of the home turned up a chilling video of small children re-enacting a hostage beheading, as well as videos of anti-coalition sermons being delivered in mosques all over Anah. The humint team went to work immediately, questioning the suspects in their own homes.

In such situations, some suspects don’t realize how much trouble they’re in, and think they can avoid detention by giving up information, the team leader said. For others, the shock of seeing U.S. troops burst into their home breaks down their resistance. The highest-ranking JTJ detainee was the most talkative. “Marwan dimed out the rest of his cell,” the humint team leader said.

The Apache troops went about their business so stealthily that by the time they left the following morning, “no one knew we were there,” Albertus said.

Apache troops later learned that Abu Hamza tried calling his leaders that morning and couldn’t figure out why no one was answering their phones. ….

His organization collapsing around him, Abu Hamza lashed out. A spate of four murders rocked Anah as the insurgent leader assassinated those he wrongly assumed were providing intelligence to Apache.

On July 13, he sent a suicide car bomber against the Iraqi army checkpoint on the road to Rawah. The bomb exploded, wounding 12 but killing none but the driver. It was Abu Hamza’s last throw of the dice. ….

In the three months it took Apache to take down the Abu Hamza group, the company fired live rounds only three times: when engaging the two suicide vehicle bombers, and when ambushing the roadside bomb cell. “It’s been more of a police action than combat,” the humint team leader said.

Abu Hamza himself vanished, withdrawn by the JTJ and replaced with another leader in charge of a new cell. But this group was composed mostly of outsiders, with few of the local ties that enabled Abu Hamza’s men to remain hidden for so long. The JTJ’s grip on the collective psyche of Anah had “absolutely” been broken, the humint team leader said.